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We outline the design of a framework for modelling cloud computing systems.The approach is based
on a declarative programming model which takes the form of a λ -calculus enriched with suitable
mechanisms to express and enforce application-level security policies governing usages of resources
available in the clouds. We will focus on the server side of cloud systems, by adopting a pro-active
approach, where explicit security policies regulate server’s behaviour.
1 Overview
In the old times, people used to exploit the bakery’s oven for their home-made bread. Similarly, people
utilised the public mill to obtain flour from their wheat. In both cases, people did not own the physical
infrastructure to process their products, neither they invested on it. Instead, they rented usage from
a third-party provider. Under this regard, the idea of cloud computing is not completely new, it just
updates the above model and adapt it to the Internet world. Cloud Computing customers do not invest on
hardware, software or services, but they just pay providers to use them, either on a utility or a subscription
basis. They rely on clouds for infrastructures, platforms, and software. Cloud services and the resources
they offer over the Internet are therefore used on demand and with a certain degree of flexibility. Thus,
Cloud Computing is changing the fundamental way in which computing services are being delivered.
Usually, Cloud services are based on (a farm of) servers, often virtual ones, and are fully managed
by their providers. Consequently, old and new security problems may arise, because security is related to
trust as more and more customers use Cloud services. Since Cloud environment is dynamically changing
and shared by a number of users, customers expect their data or resources, when are outsourced, to be
protected in Clouds. These expectations or requirements are usually captured in Service Level Agree-
ment, and therefore enforcing SLAs is one of key aspects of Cloud Computing. As a result, a number of
challenging issues comes into consideration. By going deep into it, Cloud services consist of two major
parts: business logic and operation logic. The former models the core functionalities of the services. The
later formalizes instead the operational tasks, i.e. the resource behavior of Cloud services. Furthermore,
from the resource viewpoint, cloud resources come from all levels of the computing stack, hence the ef-
fective management of the operations acting over dynamically available resources must be handled more
carefully, possibly through strict security policies.
Although Cloud Computing has been introduced in order to outsource IT facilities across the entire
stack, integration is one of its important aspects. The purpose of integration is to allow customers to
create and/or custom applications specifically suited to their unique business processes and policies.
Hence it gives an ability to modify cloud services to match the needs of a particular goal. Again, security
issues become more problematic under these circumstances.
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In this paper, we advocate the usage of a declarative model based on functions with side effect to
abstractly represent services acting over resources and service assemblies. Our main contribution is the
formal semantics of cloud servers as functions, expressed in a suitable dialect of the λ -calculus and the
modelling of clients interactions is via asynchronous invocation. Next, we informally present the main
features of our approach.
Services as functions with side effects We adopt the idea of Software as a service: each service exposes
over the network certain functional behaviour and it is invoked via request/response communication pro-
tocols (e.g. SOAP). Services are pluggable entities and composite services are obtained by combining
existing elementary or complex services. Following [7, 8] cloud services are viewed as functions. How-
ever, a service is not a pure function as its execution yields a side effect, thus reflecting changes of the
service state. For instance, let us consider a simple storage service, offered by a cloud, that gets a string
query from the user and accordingly queries the database. The following functional interface can be used
to describe the above service.
Table fun Q(Query q): Effect e
The invocation of the service Q with a query value will yield a table value as result. The side effect e
provides the abstract representation of the modifications to the database such as updates of tables. Here,
the side effects represent the action of accessing service resources.
The main benefit of the service-as-function metaphor, with respect to alternative approaches based
on process calculi (see [10] for a survey), is that it provides a high-level notion to model services, their
composition and interactions, by abstracting from low level details.
Security Policies In spite of its undeniable advantages and cost-savings, cloud computing makes data
processing inherently risky, as data reside not under the user’s control. Consequently, it is crucial that
safety is addressed when designing a cloud.
Our programming model focuses on application-based security by considering security policies as
first class programming constructs. We provide explicit constructs to declare and enforce the security
policies governing the behaviour of applications, in the style of [5, 6]. A security policy regulates how
resources are granted to and used by services. For instance, let us consider the database service example
above. The Q service may be unsafe although the code normally runs in most of the cases. An attacker
can indeed taint the query string by injecting a command in front (SQL injection bug); consequently the
service would issue dangerous commands such as deleting a file before executing the safe query.
From a methodological perspective, being security-oriented from the very beginning of the develop-
ment process facilitates the design of secure services: security is faced in advance, without sweeping it
under the carpet (read it as security patches added later). The database service example above can be
moved into a more secure land, by wrapping it inside a suitable security policy ϕDB. For instance, the
policy can impose that no update operations on the database (i.e. system commands) can be issued during
service executions, i.e. the only operations allowed are those in which the database content can only be
read. Adding the specified policy to the query interface results in:
Table fun Q(Query q): Effect e ensuring ϕDB
meaning that each step of service execution must obey the security policy ϕDB. Operationally, the run-
time structures will enforce the security policy ϕDB by monitoring service execution and by catching the
occurrences of bad actions, i.e. the actions that violate the policies. Actually, the run-time enforcement
mechanism depends on a suitable abstraction of the execution of all the pieces of code (possibly partially)
executed so far. This implies that the mechanism enforcing the security policies can make decisions,
based on all previous changes of shared resources affected by different user requests. This approach,
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known under the name of history-based security, has been receiving major attention, at both levels of
foundations [3, 12, 13] and of language design/implementation [1, 11].
Cloud server Abstractly a cloud server can take the form of a pool of services and computational re-
sources running over a variety of virtual machines. More precisely, a cloud server is a triple (η ✄ e1 ‖
e2 · · · ‖ ek✁σ). The pair (η ,σ) is the global cloud state. The η-component, called history, stores the
abstract representation of the cloud behaviour. More precisely, this component exposes the evolution
of the cloud, by detailing the occurrences of the concrete bindings among resources and services. The
σ -component, called service store, provides a virtual representation of the service metadata supporting
facilities to store and retrieve services. Here, a service store σ is a function mapping each service name
pi with the metadata and scripts used to load the virtual machine and the resources required to run the
service. Intuitively, the service name plays the role of of the service functional interface and our service
store is a sort of service directory. Our semantic framework handles service metadata as persistent en-
tities, i.e. they are not consumed by an invocation, but they remain in the service store. Finally, the last
component e1 ‖ e2 · · · ‖ ek represents the expression that describes the set of services running in parallel.
Services are functions similar to expressions in the λ -calculus with a side effect acting on the global
cloud state. Services are equipped with suitable primitives for accessing resources, for declaring and
enforcing security policies, and for installing services and managing their invocation. For simplicity,
we assume that resources are objects that are already available in the cloud environment (i.e. resources
cannot be dynamically created).
We can specify the database service discussed above as follows:
E f orm = λq. Eproc q where Eproc = λy. open(db);(query db y);close(db),
where E f orm is the cloud service acting as logical front-end with the actual database. The service gets
a query string 〈q〉 from a user, then feeds it to Eproc. In turn, the function Eproc takes the query y as a
parameter, connects to the database db, makes a query to db, by exploiting an auxiliary function query
with the database and the query string as parameters, then closes the database connection. We abstract
from the details of the code of the query function here, we just assume that it may perform some internal
activities and then issues the database command dbcmd and returns a value v.
Assume now that the configuration of the cloud server takes the form η✄ link E f orm ‖ E✁σ . Here,
the cloud server has activated the book-keeping service link E f orm that in parallel with the execution of
the services E performs the dynamic publication of the database service E f orm. The constructor link E is
a novel construct of the calculus introduced to describe the dynamic publication of a service whose code
is E . Operationally, the execution of the link-construct has the side effect of installing in the service store
the service E including all the required metadata.
In our running example, this leads to the following evolution of the cloud server:
(η✄ link E f orm ‖ E✁σ) link−−→ (η · link✄E✁σ [Q → E f orm])
The target configuration indicates that a new service, called Q, is now available in the cloud. Furthermore,
the history η logs the fact that a dynamic publication has been performed.
Client interactions are modelled explicitly: they occur via asynchronous communication in the style
of the asynchronous pi-calculus. Intuitively, the invocation of the service pi available in the service storage
is only observed by the asynchronous occurrence of the activation of the code associated with pi . For
instance, in our running example, we have:
(η · link✄E✁σ [Q → E f orm]) invokeQ(q)−−−−−−→ (η · link · invokeQ(q)✄E f ormq ‖ E✁σ [Q → E f orm]).
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This transition, that uses the new construct invokeQ(q), indicates that an instance of the service Q has
been activated on the actual parameter q. This instance of the service runs in parallel with the other active
services. Moreover, the service Q is still available in the cloud (i.e. services are permanent objects) and
the history η logs the fact that an activation of the service has been performed.
Our treatment of service invocation has the consequent benefit to manage a variety of clients, by
abstracting from the specific interaction protocols established with the cloud.
Back to our running example, the database service runs as follows, where η ′ stands for η · link ·
invokeQ(q):
(η ′✄E f ormq ‖ E✁σ [Q → E f orm])
τ
−→ (η ′,✄Eproc q ‖ E✁σ [Q → E f orm])
τ
−→ (η ′,✄open(db);((query db q);close(db)) ‖ E✁σ [Q → E f orm])
open(db)
−−−−−→ (η ′ ·open(db)✄ ((query db q);close(db)) ‖ E✁σ [Q → E f orm])
τ
−→
∗ dbcmd
−−−→
τ
−→
∗
(η ′ ·open(db) ·dbcmd✄ close(db) ‖ E✁σ [Q → E f orm])
τ
−→
∗ close(db)
−−−−−→ (η ′ ·open(db) ·dbcmd · close(db)✄E ✁σ [Q → E f orm])
As previously discussed, this behaviour is unsafe because it may contain a SQL injection bug: an
attacker can try to inject a command in front of query string, e.g. syscmd;q′, and therefore can execute
any dangerous command such as deleting a file as as illustrated by the following trace :
.
.
.
τ
−→ (η ′,✄open(db);((query db (syscmd;q′));close(db)) ‖ E✁σ [Q → E f orm])
open(db)
−−−−−→ (η ′ ·open(db)✄ ((query db (syscmd;q′));close(db)) ‖ E✁σ [Q → E f orm])
syscmd
−−−−→ (η ′ ·open(db) · syscmd✄ ((query db q′);close(db)) ‖ E✁σ [Q → E f orm])
τ
−→
∗ dbcmd
−−−→
τ
−→
∗
(η ′ ·open(db) · syscmd ·dbcmd✄ close(db) ‖ E✁σ [Q → E f orm])
τ
−→
∗ close(db)
−−−−−→ (η ′ ·open(db) · syscmd ·dbcmd · close(db)✄E ✁σ [Q → E f orm])
To prevent this, we instrument the code E f orm by framing it with a security policy ϕDB, which does
not allow execution of any system command.
Following the approach of [5, 6], a security policy is a set of traces that describe the sequences of
events satisfying that policy. Security policies are specified via usage automata [4] a suitable extension
of Finite State Automata (FSA), whose final states denote policy violations. The usage automation of
ϕDB is depicted in Fig.1 and the following traces show how to prevent execution of any system command:
.
.
.
open(db)
−−−−−→ (η ′ ·open(db)✄ϕDB[((query db (syscmd;q′));close(db))] ‖ E✁σ [Q → E f orm])
6
syscmd
−−−−→
In the full paper [9], we introduced a notion of abstract semantics for cloud server by extending
the notion of applicative bisimulation [2]. Intuitively, the idea behind applicative bisimulation is that in
order to reason on the equivalence of two functions, we need to know whether their behaviors are the
same with all possible closed values. As a consequence, applicative bisimulation relies on the output
generated by functions, hence it does not capture the events issued by our functions The management
of events is crucial in our framework. Service behaviour is indeed history-dependent, i.e. an expression
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q0 q1 q1
open(db)
close(db)
dbcmd
syscmd
Figure 1: Usage automaton of the service Q
.
may be executed differently when plugged within different cloud states. For instance, let us consider
the cloud servers: (η✄β ;α ;ϕ [γ ]✁σ) and (η✄α ;β ;ϕ [γ ]✁σ), where η contains neither α nor β , and
the policy ϕ states that the sequence α ;β is not allowed. After two transitions, the first configuration
can make a transition that issues γ , while the second cannot. We obtain a particular bisimulation (called
cloud bisimulation) that is proved to be also a congruence and that allows us to prove that policy framings
do not add new behaviors to the wrapped programs, i.e. behaviours of the wrapped programs are always
simulated by their origins. Intuitively, behaviour that violates the policy is prevented to occur. In the
running example, it appears that ϕDB[E f orm]. E f orm.
In summary, technical results give rise to a semantics-based methodology of safety refinement pro-
cess in cycle of software development. Even though our present definition of bisimilarity would require
an infinite number of checks, we are confident to circumvent this problem, by resorting to symbolic
techniques, like the one defined in the field of software model checking.
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